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George Steiner, Grammars of Creation, New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 2001.
The argument against George Steiner was given eloquent airing by
James Woods back in 1996, written in response to the publication of
No Passion Spent, Steiner's selected essays. (And since Grammars of
Creation also serves as a condensed summation of Steiner's intellect-
ual career, Woods's argument holds for both.) It was a stinging attack,
in which Woods adopted a tone of wounded democratic pride in the face
of Steiner's Eurocentricity (with its concomitant anti-Americanism aro
totalitarian flirtation). Woods was sprightly and fleet as he danced on
the tracks of Steiner's juggernaut progress, quoting approvingly
Nabokov's dismissal of Steiner's essays as 'built on solid abstractions
and opaque generalisations'.
Then, I couldn't help but agree with Woods; now, I'm not so sure.
Grammars of Creation, as the summa of Steiner's various provoc-
ations, reveals that his virtues have overgrown his vices. The 'melo-
drama of transcendence' that Woods isolates as Steiner's central sin has
proven more remarkable and enduring than the performances of the
post-structuralists whose decay has granted such weird, marvellous
shape to Steiner's rhetorical armature.
A note, first, about the origin of these essays as the Gifford
Lectures for 1990, delivered at the University of Glasgow: the
diminution in expressive range occasioned by the movement from
speech to text is as old as the book itself. Stylistic tics or
eccentricities forgiven and even relished in the spoken word appear
crude in print. Suspecting that the dour earnestness of ink on paper
might be doing Steiner a disservice, I downloaded audio files culled
from these lectures. They were immensely telling. His voice is
incantatory, the vehicle of an adroit, consciously wielded irony, laid in
as ballast against his wilder flights of recondite exuberance. A just
reader would, I hope, listen for these mitigating tones of self-irony,
whose presence the text can only suggest.
The Gifford lectureships were originally established to 'promote
and diffuse the study of Natural Theology in the widest sense of the
term - in other words, the knowledge of God'. Steiner's lectures, on
the other hand, form a theological negative: provisional, decentred,
and fragmentary; primarily concerned with the rigours aro
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responsibilities attending on God's absence rather than with those
duties imposed by Her presence. And yet he starts, biblically enough,
with beginnings:
The 'Word' that was in the 'beginning', for the pre-50cratics as well
as for 51. John, comprised a generative, dynamic eternity out of which
time could spring forward, a present indicative of 'to be' pregnant (in
an almost material sense) with 'shall' and 'will'. Future tenses are an
idiom of the messianic.
Steiner's diagnosis of the present will be familiar: that of an era
suffering core tiredness - a time of ontological weariness inimical to
the creation of art. If God is 'in the grammar', he submits, the
grammatology of atheism lacks a future tense. This means the end of
the concept we know as hope, anchored as it is in eschatology. The
end result? A rupture in the stability of linguistic structures. 'Take
away energising anticipation, the luminous imperative of waiting', he
writes, 'and these tenses will be end-stopped':
'Life-expectancy' is, then, no longer messianic-utopian, but an
actuarial statistic. Such pressures on the incipience of meaning and
communication in the individual and communal sub-conscious, on the
means of articulate speech, are gradual.... But just as the almost
imperceptible tectonic movements in the deeps of the earth sever and
re-shape continents, so the forces emanating from the eclipse of the
messianic will find manifest expression. Grammars of nihilism
flicker, as it were, on the horizon.
Sobering stuff, this, with the lectures proceeding as variations
upon the theme of creation; its theological roots, present decline, am
latter prominence as the shared province of artist and God. This means
covering some old ground. If the artwork constitutes a 'second'
creation, then the artist is God at second-hand, or, in more ambitious
guises, a pretender to the throne. Thus, the analogous link between
artist and God that is our Platonic inheritance, an idea whose durability
is reflected in its ongoing appeal, from Classical antiquity to the
Renaissance - up to its present incarnation emerging from the nexus
of Enlightenment aesthetics and full-blown Romanticism. Steiner also
traces the crucial difference between classical and modem versions of
this analogy. Where Plato's 'Demiourgos (the very word means
'craftsman ') moulds, cuts, splices, forges the raw material spilling out
of chaos', creating ideal fonns from the flux, where the artist-creator
mimes through the artwork the divine gesture of 'bodying forth', the
Judeo-Christian God perfonns an act of unique extremity. More than
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simply moulding the universe from prior material - mere cosmic
flotsam and jetsam - the artist creates it ex nihilo. Here, 'no pre-
existent materiality, be it the wild vacancy of chaos, is conceivable'.
We know the end of the story, also: from the Romantic era onward,
this notion of emergence 'from nothing' was applied to the artwork as
an aesthetic Genesis-myth. And as an explanation for the more
splendid labours of the imagination it served as a justification, an
imperative - a spur to greater creative ambitiousness. It was the
means by which Romantic artists freed themselves from the bonds of
classical models, too, with poets, rather than obeying those laws
handed down from above, enacting their own legislation, for their own
'governments of the tongue'. This, Steiner concludes, was a brave,
ingenious, and ultimately quixotic strategy. No artist is ever entirely
free of the tug of the real or the weight of the past: 'In respect of
impurity, of invasive realism, language is totally vulnerable. No
immaculateness is possible'. Language, freighted as it is with
historical meaning, inevitably defeats the poet's most heroic efforts to
- in the Mallarmean formulation - 'cleanse the words of the tribe'.
Woods grudgingly admits that Steiner is more philosophically
literate than most critics, 'competently dragging the heavy iron of the
Germanic tradition into his corner whenever he can'. And certainly his
ideas about poetry bear the imprint of Schopenhauer in holding that
the purpose of art is to free us from the terrible drudgery of the
mundane, the everyday. But such a vision of art presupposes hierarchy;
a notion which might satisfy Steiner's taxonomical fetish but is
anathema to the avowedly relativistic present. This difference is
compounded by Steiner's restricting his interest to the upper rungs of
the ladder, his exultation in lyric poetry, music and mathematics,
emerging from a certainty that such higher efforts are a justification or
apology for otherwise bestial humankind.
Steiner, to be sure, is never more vulgar than when asserting the
primacy of the great over the merely good. I'm thinking of Auden
again, when he suggested that only a minor talent could be a perfect
gentleman; that a major talent was always a bit of a cad. 'Now am
again' he suggested, 'an exquisite minor work can make a master feel
thoroughly ashamed of himself. In this refusal to countenance the
existence of a permeable membrane between high and low, lies the
better part of the frustration Steiner inspires in the reader. He sees no
contradiction in subjecting the Commedia to a penetrating re-reading
(during which he offers Dante on a silver platter as the greatest of all
poets, a touchstone of Western literature) while the reader is aware, all
along, that it is a work De vulgari eloquentia. It is intriguing to
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imagine Steiner as Dante's contemporary: not to write in Latin! The
horror!
'Great' literature has gained its bulk by feeding upon the plankton
of popular culture. Acknowledging this in no way diminishes the
value of the work. Think of Lolita without the advertising culture of
mid-century America; Don Quixote without the romances of the day.
But here, again, from vice has arisen an exemplary virtue: the drawing
of new connections between disparate works. By wrenching the novel,
poem, tragedy free from its social-historical context, Steiner isolates
and makes manifest the raw materials of the creative act. This is a
worthy task for any critic, and these lectures in their brevity reveal this
intention with a greater topographical coherence than in his more
discrete texts. What is it that this interrelation reveals? 'Absolute
literature', a term defined with insight and precision by Roberto
Calasso during his recent Weidenfeld lectures, comes closest to
expressing Steiner's signal virtue:
it is precisely this process of osmotic transmission, from one work to
the next, that, whenever the rash gesture that is absolute literature
begins to take shape, renders every other connotation. whether of
school. national tradition. or historical moment. inconsistent and
secondary. The writers who in some way engage in that bold gesture
will thus tend to form a sort of communion of saints. where the same
fluid circulates from work to work. and each calls to the other from an
affinity that is far stronger than any that might tie them to their time.
or some trend - even to their own physiology and taste.
Woods writes of Steiner that he has 'sensations rather than
arguments'. Perhaps this is true. But this supposed limitation has
provided Professor Steiner with perfect literary pitch. He knows that
literature is not to be identified by adherence to theory; it will be
marked by a peculiar vibration, a luminous quality which resists
appropriation. This kind of literature is sufficient unto itself, he has
argued, rather than being merely, destructively, self-reverential.
GEORDIE WILLIAMSON
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Arthur C. Danto, After the End of Art: Contemporary
Art and the Pale of History, The A. W.Mellon Lectures
on the Fine Arts 1995, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1997.
'concerning the end of art' (p. xiii)
'there is no longer a pale of history' (p. xiii)
'perfect aesthetic entropy' (p. 12).
The subtitle. For Hegel, whose Absolute Spirit gets some four or
five mentions (pp. 29, 124, 188, 105, 195), the art of peoples without
the pale of history (as seen from lena) was not art. Now that since the
late 1960s (cf. pp. 25, 26, & note the Kojeve reference, pp. 32-33)
there is no more [art-)history, all art - if there be any - is beyond
the pale (cf. pp. xiii, 9; title of chapter 6).
Beyond the Pale was the title of the Aboriginal art exhibition at
the last Adelaide Festival, so it is not only Sean Scully (lrish-
American) who can relish the collapse of the Pale, but so can
Australia's first international art movement. (See Beyond the Pale, A.
G. South Australia 2000, and Australia's First International Art
Movement, Boulter & Hodges, Utopia Art, Sydney, 1990.) And, if we
don't watch out, this art we'll read as MoMA taught us (pp. 10, III,
114, 202).
The title. The phrase 'the end of art', to which Danto himself refers
as 'this doubtless incendiary expression' (p. xv), invokes the
comparable phrase, 'the end of cookery'. After this, what? crudites?
kickshaws at every meal? classic cuisine at only the grand
restaurantslmusees? Whether this joke hits off Danto's elegant set of
essays, the reader of them must discover for herself.
Early on, Danto draws the sting of his key phrase about the 'end':
'I ... in no sense [claim) that art [is) going to stop being made' (p.
25). The thesis of 'the end' does not entail THE END, but (as Cole
Porter put it) 'anything goes'.
It's crucial that 'the end of art' (an expression which occurs
upwards of seventeen times) declines by about p. 114 into 'the end of
art-history', and might always have been so written, with hyphen.
Not that art-history for Danto is what university departments teach,
i.e. chronicle, workshop practice, provenancing etc. etc., but Art-
History, where art has been governed by almost-Grand Narratives,
notably two: Vasari's and Greenberg's. These have now run out of
time; the perfection of mimetic representation, which Vasari did not
live to see (see the 'brown walls' of the Art Gallery of NSW, or
Melbourne's Chloe) was over-accomplished by around 1880 am
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modernism, as a consequence, began. Greenberg's narrative - in
which 'the subject of painting is painting' and painters' 3D space is
replaced by the flatness of a flat medium and only canvas staining
remains legitimate - this is now over.
Greenberg could not deal with Pop Art and it dealt him the deadliest
of blows, reducing him to sarcastic silence. Of pop Danto writes:
I subscribe to a narrative of history of modern art in which pop plays
the philosophically central role. In my narrative, pop marked the end
of the great narrative of Western art by bringing to self-consciousness
the truth of an (p. 122, italics added).
Danto, under Hegel's spell, sees art as not serving the Grand Narrative
of mimesis (Pliny, Vasari, Academic Art), or the Greenbergian
Narrative of an inexorable movement from mere abstraction to -
ultimately - purity. Rather, Danto sees art as bound to the telos of
uncovering 'philosophical truth' (p.122), i.e. the truth about itself.
Danto, for reasons we cannot go into here, in his elegant account of
Greenberg, fails to see the full tension between Greenberg's particular
historicism and his Kantian notion of Art-as-Critical. Danto's own
historicism - ala Hegel - leads him, beyond Greenberg's purism, to
art's Sphinx riddle: 'What makes the difference between an artwork am
something which is not an artwork if in fact they look exactly alike?'
(p.125, italics added).
Danto's thought in After the End is haunted by Warhol's Brillo
Box, and the illustration which leads off chapter 1 is Not Andy Warhol
(Brillo Box), by Mike Bidlo, which by being meta makes Danto's
crucial question go meta. (Into this quasi- Duchampian 'meta' we need
not go here.) See the Index under 'Brillo Box'.) When Danto
encountered Warhol's Brillo Box, this something-one-knows-not-what
in the (then contested) field of works of art raised talk about art from
the level of the two Grand Narratives which Danto privileges to the
plane of the philosophy-seminar question above. Danto goes on, on
the page just cited: 'It seems to me now that the philosophical
problem of art had been clarified from within the history of art, that
history had come to an end' (p.125, italics added; cf. also p.105; for a
set of instants with Hegel, see pp. 14, 16, 31, [33 freedom, cf. also
p.45] 36,66,68,77,95,113, 122, 124,135,147-48, 169, 188, 194,
199, 217). In the spirit of a certain (pre-post-historical) Cambridge
Positivist one comments, 'Say that if you want to, but smile as you
do so'. Danto has already grinned at least, in a slightly different
context:
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Let me somewhat self-consciously and somewhat sheepishly invoke
the heavy metaphysical conceit that Painting with a capital P. or Art
with a capital A eltists on a plane with Spirit or Geist in the old
Hegelian narratives (p.105).
On the whole. Danto's use of Hegel lacks the full Teutonic
heaviness. but one suspects a logically odd pun on Sispirit in at least
one crux:
we can imagine two red squares, one eltecuted in the spirit of
Kierkegaardian jokes [about an a11-over-red painting said to depict the
... Red Sea after the Israelites had crossed. etc.]. and one in the spirit
of Suprematism. which look enough alike that the temptation would
be to place them in the same position on the style matrilt [see p. I63),
but which actually have very different stylistic attributes. not to speak
of different interpretations and meanings (p. I67).
The hovering s/Spirit word might delight Empsonians while troubling
logicians. There may be such a crux. too. at p. 5. This 'siS' thing is
not a mere quibble since. if History has stopped. Absolute Spirit may
for all one knows have abdicated. there being nothing left worth
marching through. But - essentially - spirit (in one small-letter
sense) remains.
But what is the difference between:
(a) a Brillo Box in the supermarket. and
(b) Brillo Box. in the art-market?
(The mind comes to ask'. p.169; 'few works have meant as much to
me as Warhol's Brillo Box'. p.178.) The spirit in which (b) was made
is the difference. Danto says (p. xviii) that he gave the eleven
insightful and irritating lectures for the sake of the eleventh. The
Modalities of History'. In this essay he reveals (among other things)
his notion of the essence of art (essentialism - see. e.g .• pp. 69. 95.
and the second line of chapter II). Danto claims to be at once an
essentialist and an historicist. In chapter 10. Danto had observed. a
propos a popular-art candyworkers' art show in which candy was
manufactured. exhibited and contexted as art: 'A candy bar that is a
work of art need not be some especially good candy bar. It just has to
be a candy bar produced with the intention that it be art' (p.85. italics
added). This intention is - sufficiently nuanced - the essence. AM
intention -> intension. 'Art works are embodied meanings' (p.195).
or intensions. The spirit for such embodiment is the necessary (if not
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sufficient?) condition of a's being an art work. Perhaps the meatiest
part of Danto's book is this:
The difference, philosophically, between an institutionalist like
Dickie and myself is not that I was essentialist and he was not, but
that I felt that the decisions of the art world in constituting something
a work of art, required a class of reasons to keep the decisions from
being merely fiats or arbitrary will (p.195).
In this journal I have suggested that Duchamp (whom Danto does not
treat as as central as Warhol) made 'art', not by 'fiat' but by
perforrnative utterance. However, Danto's pair - 'reasons' rather than
'fiats' - will do very well. He goes on:
And in truth I felt that according the status of art to Brillo Box and to
Fountain was less a matter of declaration than of discovery. The
experts really were experts in the same way in which astronomers are
experts on whether something is a star. They saw that these works had
meanings which their indiscernible counterparts lacked, and they saw
as well the way these works embodied those meanings. These were
works simply made for the end of art inasmuch as there was very little
to them in tenns of sensuous presentation, and a sufficient degree of
what Hegel tenns 'judgment' to license the admittedly somewhat
reckless claim I sometimes made that art had nearly turned into
philosophy.
There is a further consideration bearing on the institutional
account, and which has played a considerable role in my thinking
about art, namely, that an object precisely (or precisely enough) like
one accorded the status of artwork in 1969 could not have been
accorded that status in 1865 or 1765. The concept of art, as
essentialist, is timeless. But the extension of the tenn is historically
indexed - it really is as if the essence reveals itself through history,
which is part of what WOlfflin may be taken to have implied in
saying, 'Not everything is possible at all times, and certain thoughts
can only be thought at certain stages of the development'. History
belongs to the extension rather than the intention of the concept of
art, and, again, with the notable exception of Hegel, virtually no
philosophers have taken seriously the historical dimension of art
(pp.195-96).
This is both insightful and useful. especially as 'reasons' entail
'experts'. The philosophical seminar has been fruitful. A little later
Danto writes:
Had he not taken over his colleague Popper's scorn for Hegel,
[Gombrich] might have seen that both content and means of
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presentation are themselves historical concepts, though the faculty of
the mind to which they answer is not perception but ... 'judgment'.
And in view of the historical constraints on the two, let us call them
Hegelian conditions, Fountain (which in any case was epicyclical on
the history of plumbing) and Brillo Box (which alludes to the history
of manufacture not to mention the history of standards of domestic
cleanliness) could not have been works of art at any earlier moment.
(We might define their historical moment as any time in which they
could have been works of art.) (p. 196).
The parenthesis has the look of circularity, but let that pass. A page
later Danto writes:
The conjunction of essentialism and historicism helps define the
present moment in the visual arts. As we seek to grasp the essence of
art - or to speak less portentously of an adequate philosophical
definition of art - our task is immensely facilitated by the recognition
that the extension of the term 'work of art' is now altogether open, so
that in effect we live in a time when everything is possible for artists,
when in the phrase I have taken over from Hegel, there is no longer a
'pale of history'. What are we now to say in response to Heinrich
Wolftlin's claim, cited more than once in this text, that not
everything is possible at every time? 'Every artist', he specifies,
'finds certain visual possibilities before him, to which he is bound',
so that 'even the most original talent cannot proceed beyond certain
links which are fixed for it by the date of its birth'. Surely this must be
as true of artists born into a pluralistic art world, and for whom
everything is possible, as for artists born into the art world of
Periclean Athens or the Aorence of the Medicis. One does not escape
the constraints of history by entering the post·historic~1 period. So
in whatever way it is true of the post-historical period In which we
find ourselves that everything is possible, this must be consistent
with W(j\fflin's thought that not everything is possible. The gamey
whiff of contradiction must be dispelled by making distinctions
between the everything that is possible, and the everything that is
not. And that in part is the task of this last chapter (p. 188).
The 'gamey whiff of contradiction' shares the perfumed air with the
whiff of the possibility that all this - true and useful as it
undoubtedly is - might be done with a lesser kind of History than
Hegel's: that is, within a sense of 'one damn thing after another',
tidied up a bit; or by the stuff in (mere) Art History departments (see
pp. 69, 165, 172, 178-79, 197-98). Even post-historic art still needs
its local history, and it may be that a lot of local history is all we have
ever had, or can have.
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The most exciting part of Danto's chapter 11 to a prehistoric, pre-
post-historic Positivist like myself is his account of the 'form of life'
(see pp. 200 ff.), and the fonn[s] of activity which generated
America's Most Wanted, a kitsch-(but-why-not) landscape with
alhistorical figures, made by Vitaly Komar and Alexander Melarnid
(l/lus. p. 214), painted in response to questionnaires put to people in
general about what they liked (expected?) in works of art. These
enquiries went far beyond the 1970s 'The General Public Judges
Modern Art' project of the Toronto Art Gallery, in which mimesis and
Aristotle Poetics 4 came out tops (UNESCO Courier, March 1971);
and the KomarlMelamid enquiry issued, not in mere avowed
preferences, but in preferences satisfied. America's Most Wanted is
not 'a masterpiece', but the whole generative shebang was (p.116).
The manipulation of the 'a priori aesthetic universal' (p. 213) thrown
up by questionnaires supplies an example from which at least part of
the essence of PoMo may be inferred. Danto writes apropos this and
other (empirical) examples, 'The true heroes of the post-historical
period [period?) are artists who are masters of every style without
having a painterly style at all' (p. 217). They do not 'use' pre-post-
historical styles, but 'mention' them (pp. 205 ff.). Nice (see, for
example, Lot 89 in 2610812001 Christie's Contemporary Sydney
catalogue, Julia Ciccarone, Struggle to Define, a von Guerard waterfall
1/8 concealed by a red velvet curtain). Pop was - perhaps - that
which showed that 'Anything can be art' and 'inaugurates the greatest
era of freedom that art has ever known' (pp. 144, 122), is
transfigurational (p. 125), and brings 'to self-consciousness the
philosophical truth of art' (p. 122). Perhaps it's 'embodied' Fay ce
que voudras (pp. xiv, 44-45, 123, 126, 107, etc.) - and now that this
secret of freedom is out, PoMo is the realization of that earlier
realization. But, as ever, 'what you see is what you get'. And if you
don't get it, you need to 'see' behind the visual (to the questionnaire,
catalogue, programme, and so on). It's not, now, to History that we
must look, but to Gerede, which for all its ominous Gennan capital,
means 'gossip'. Vasari was as much a gossip, after all, as he was a
Grand Narrator. Greenberg, in the few conversations I had with him,
was an ardent historicist ('manifest destiny' stuff), but his history
stopped before Danto says Hegel's did. Danto wins (but see pp. 165,
169, 187-89, 197-98, etc.).
Might not there be future Pretenders to the title of Grand Narrator?
Danto reckons the future to be unimaginable (chapter 7), so don't
worry. The Wicked Witch is dead! '''We don't need another narrative'"
(Barbara Kruger, see p.132).
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For all the irony of this review, the recommendation to read this
book! is offered in utter sincerity. It's irritating, yes, but it is full of
clear-sighted observation and deep reflection.
PATRICK HUTCHINGS
Philip Fisher, Wonder, the Rainbow, and the Aesthetics
of Pure Experiences, Cambridge, Mass., and London,
Harvard University Press, 1998.
Since the late 'eighties, Philip Fisher has emerged as a
distinctively American kulturkritik. Indeed, he has been claiming of
late that it is the radical task of the United States to forge ever new
modes of representation, be it culturally or socially, commercially or
technologically. Nowhere, according to Fisher in Still the New World
(1999), is the 'one permanent revolution, that of competitive
technological capitalism' better demonstrated than in the poetry,
painting, and novels of radical modernity that is America. At the same
time, Fisher is mindful of the way in which our cultural institutions,
particularly museums, remove art works from their original contexts
not only from their place amongst objects with which they were
initially grouped, but also from the multitude of attitudes and activities
by means of which they were regarded. Instead, so Fisher contends in
Making and Effacing Art (1991), past works are fundamentally re-
assembled in order to locate them stylistically, if not temporally, with
other works. By so doing, museums nowadays can be construed as the
specific destination of contemporary and future artworks; a destination
with which modern painting - notably that of Jasper Johns and Frank
Stella - has engaged in a teasing dialogue.
However, the temptation to plot Fisher's revival of interest in the
notion of the wondrous against this larger background of concerns
shall be resisted in this critical review. Instead, let us depict
something of the terrain of Wonder. the Rainbow, and the Aesthetics
of Pure Experiences. Carefully focusing our attention upon the
'fragile' notion of making sense or becoming intelligible, as distinct
from the nature of knowing or certainty itself, intimates that the work
under review is, in its author's terms, an 'antiphilosophical project'
(pp. 8, 9). Perhaps it is rhetorically 'antiphilosophical' in so far as
Fisher preys upon traditional appeals to the sublime in aesthetic
enquiry and, more poi'.ltedly, deletes Kant entirely from discussion.
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Nonetheless, Fisher appears to begin conventionally enough when
he seizes upon Socrates' assertion in the Theaetetus (l55d 1-5) that the
feeling of wonder is the only point at which philosophy properly
begins. But how are we to understand the concept of wonder? Is it
applicable to states of astonishment or amazement, admiration or awe,
fascination or sorcery, stupor or stupefaction, and so forth? Is our
experience of it to be described as absorbed or enthralled, bewildered or
flabbergasted, dwnfounded or dazzled, startled or surprised, and so on?
Should we construe 'wonder' adjectivally or nominally so to speak -
as 'How wondrous!' or as 'What a wonder!' respectively? Or, would it
be better countenanced as a verb - 'to wonder why' (or, presumably,
'whether ... which 0 •• when ... how. 0 0 what 0 0 • at' and so on)?
Fisher deflects such questions by briefly glossing some of these
possibilities with the observation that the English expression 'to
wonder if preserves both the exclamatory and the interrogative uses of
the term (po 11).
Experience of wonderment, we are urged, deserves as much
attention as is traditionally given to experience of sublimity. It, too,
functions as a test-case not only of the powerful role of the rare or the
uncommon within aesthetic experience, but also of what might be
called 'intellectual seeing', the intersection of sensation and thought.
For Fisher, however, the sublime seems to function as an
'aestheticization of fear' which, 'with its epistemological companion,
fixed attention or obsession', reached its historical peak in the
'fatigued' art of the 'old world' of Europe (pp. 2, 38-39, 5). By
contrast, he contends, the wondrous functions as an 'aestheticization of
delight' which dramatically emerged with the 'ever new continents of
technique and materials' deployed by architecture and painting
'especially ... since 1873, the founding moment of Impressionism'
(pp. 2, 6, 3). Fisher com ~nds that, ever since the advent of a Louis
Sullivan and a Claude Monet, the wondrous effect of 'our first
experiences of never before used materials is denied to writing' (p. 6), a
point that begins, as we shall discover, a curious sub-theme of
Wonder, the Rainbow, and the Aesthetics of Pure Experiences.
Yet, in seemingly disparate scientific, mathematical, and artistic
cases of wonder lies the persistent characteristic of 'a slow unfolding of
attention and questioning [which] takes place in the presence of the
work' or phenomenon (pp. 6-7); a characteristic whose 'essence', in
other words, 'is the play of the mind over the details of the object
itself (p. 39). Contrary to those upholding the 'romantic' conception
that explanation abolishes wonderment, Fisher constantly maintains
that there is a 'poetics of thought' which preserves wonder when
explanation is found in successive geometric or visual
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conceptualisations of a conundrum. For that reason, continues Fisher,
'memory and narrative are antagonistic to an aesthetics of wonder' (p.
6). Nor should wonderment be identified with the conception of
estrangement, a conception along with that of sublimity that Fisher
ties to the dominant, but misguided 'romantic' idiom of so much of
European anistic practice.
Having thus mapped the conceptual territory of the wondrous,
Fisher then pursues the history of that wonder of nature, the rainbow,
largely in the work of Descanes; that wonder of mathematics, the
doubled square, in Plato's Meno; and, finally, wonderment in the
presence of two large, abstract anworks by Edwin Parker 'Cy'
Twombly. Before sketching some salient points arising from his
discussion of Twombly, it is worth noting a number of assumptions
underlying Fisher's extensive account of the rainbow, 'a central
instance of the aesthetics of wonder' (p. 33), predominantly drawn
from that furnished by Carl Boyer in The Rainbow (1987). First of all,
to enter a state of wonderment, its object must be sudden aOO
unexpected; its occurrence only emerges with 'the moment of first
seeing'; and its experience derives from 'the visual presence of the
whole state or object' (p. 21). To that extent, anything which unfolds
in time, which is sequentially or narratively conveyed, is, on Fisher's
account, precluded from being an object of wonder. Secondly, the
experience of wonder involves 'subjectivity in a unique way' (p. 36).
Indeed, the very appearance of a rainbow is only possible because of
the angle between rays of light, water droplets, and the observer to the
point that, were there no human observers. there would be no
rainbows. To recognise the convergence of angles and points of view
involved in diagrammatic forms of its visual representation is
dependent upon our imaginative capacity to 'step out of ourselves aOO
picture ourselves having an experience' (p. 123). Thirdly, to account
for the psychology of wonder and its interaction with thought or
cognition, we ought to adhere to Descanes' later conception of
psychology in us Passions de ['arne (1649).
Readers may recall how wonder (l 'admiration) is declared by
Descanes to be 'the first of all the passions' (pan 2, art. 53). Being 'a
sudden surprise of the soul' causes wonder 'to consider with attention
the objects which seem to it rare and extraordinary' (pan 2, art. 70). It
is the peculiar function of wonder to intensify our other primitive
passions or the subspecies of them since, without such an interaction.
wonder alone 'prevents our perceiving more of the object than the first
face which is presented' and thereby precludes us from 'acquiring a
more panicular knowledge of it' (pan 2, art. 73). Wonder, in this
Cartesian scheme, 'causes us to learn and retain in our memory things
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of which we were formerly ignorant' (part 2, art. 74). Conversely
expressed, without wonder we would be condemned to ignorance,
though, with an excess of wonder, we might equally an:!
indiscriminately condemn ourselves to its diminution or simply fail to
acquire further knowledge of the object that once arrested us (part 2,
art. 78). Like Descartes, Fisher aligns this 'first of all passions' with
sensation and imagination, that is, with the perceptual faculties of the
mind that arise in response to the external world; unlike Descartes,
however, Fisher is not pre-occupied with the interplay and control of
wonder and the other passions, with the moral role the passions play.
Whereas wonder without 'excess' does not have 'good or evil as its
object', the end served by the passions as a whole 'consists alone in
their fortifying and perpetuating in the soul thoughts which it is good
it should preserve' (part 2, art. 73, 71 & 74). Perhaps it is for this
kind of reason that Fisher concentrates upon the pleasurable effects of
wonder at the expense of its terrifying ones.
After attempting to dissuade us of the efficacy of memory an:!
recognition in encounters with new works of art, Fisher's concluding,
seventh chapter centres upon how they involve 'the process of
intelligibility, the path from wonder, surprise. a feeling of newness
and attention-seizing freshness to curiosity, prolonged attention,
satisfaction' (p. 149), the very process said to be evident in encounters
with the geometric resolution of the rainbow and the doubling of the
square. Two large canvases by Cy Twombly. Untitled (1970) and II
Pamasso (1964), act as Fisher's test-cases of 'radically new works ...
with which we are unfamiliar, which we cannot place in genres or
patterns of knowledge' (p. 140). Again, as in the mutatis mutandis
case of the rainbow and of the doubled square, Fisher portrays in
mesmerising detail a first encounter at the New York Museum of
Modem Art (unnamed) with the massive 1970 canvas - 405 x 640.3
cm of house paint and crayon - as follows:
To look at the work we have to think out the collision of two
recognitions: what a painting IS and what writing on a blackboard
with chalk is. By opening gaps or unexpected features within these
two recognitions the work directs us. after our initial surprise and
wonder. to a controlled set of questions and details. We begin ... from
a classic state of wonder. We have never seen anything like this
before. Its scale. sImplicity. and loveliness. the elegance of the
looping lines. its colorless beauty. strike us all at once. Its every
detail is present for our first glance when we come across the work for
the first lime in a museum. Twombly's painting solicits a very precise
and ordered attention. now to this. now to that, and it gives us a very
clear path to intelligibility.. . An Inference pattern is set off
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between the pair of recognitions, along WJlh their details, that opens
up the path to intelligibility (pp. 151-152).
For all its absorbing detail, his eloquent account from his 'horizon
as a teacher' (p. 157) of the artistically 'innocent' or decontextualised
individual making sense of Twombly seems to work at cross-purposes
with some of the contentions of his previous chapters. The initial
tension arises with the acknowledgement that contemporary art,
instead of renouncing the act of recognition, has redirected it away
from tradition, the stock of art and genres of art that make up our past,
and toward the immediate surrounding culture itself, which can, in the
work of art, be alluded to, mentioned, mocked, celebrated, or even
transfigured. These varieties of reference and recognition lead back to
the familiar, but we find them now directed toward some shared
memory from our everyday experience, not our knowledge of the
history of art. Instead of a conversation with the tradition, we find a
kind of intertextuality with everyday life (pp. 149-150).
Indeed, Fisher confesses that he rejected dealing with the work in the
context of 'American art in the generation after Jackson Pollock' (p.
157). Two overt reasons are given. Firstly, Fisher wants to emphasize
'the primary and very democratic recognition on which this work is
founded', namely, 'each person's memory of how a blackboard works
in a schoolroom' (p. 157). Secondly, he believes that Twombly's
painting 'does not depend on our creating a ... type of history into
which it neatly fits: use of line after Pollock' (p. 157).
Curiously, Fisher does not take any other kinds of context or
response into account. Anecdotally, this reviewer's young daughter
began to laugh on first sighting Twombly, convinced that it was
drawn by an elephant. His wife immediately wondered, if it were not
untitled or if it contained names, numbers or even fragmented
utterances in the manner of other works by Twombly, whether we
would change the way we look at and think of it or whether it would
ever figure in the Museum in the first place. To the reviewer, though
struck by the gigantic scale, two contexts were immediately
foregrounded: that of other paintings and drawings by Twombly
himself and those by his contemporaries and colleagues, Jasper Johns
and Robert Rauschenberg. Indeed, for many readers of this journal let
alone Fisher's book, encounters with Twombly may well be initially
shaped by having seen photographic reproductions of works. Or again,
some viewers may approach Twombly for the first time after having
read the seminal essays, 'Non multa sed multum' and 'Sagesse re
I' Art', published in 1979 by his most illustrious supporter, Roland
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Barthes, but ignored here by Fisher. In sum, Fisher comes rather close
to a purity of context and response that brute and institutional facts
would seem to deny.
At the same time, much energy is devoted to re-assigning
recognition and recollection, noting its apparent non-availability when
first facing new or alien artistic practices for which 'we have no
anecdote, no allegory, no clue to social purpose, subject, or proper
aesthetic comportment' (p. 142). Fisher, whilst articulating what it is
like to immerse oneself in the diversity of detail in Twombly's 1/
Parnasso (1964), asks, 'Does every act of seemingly nai ve description
smuggle recognitions back in without admitting it?' (p. 168). His
affirmative answer, however, is directed at opposing the rigidities of
historically, psychologically, or even theologically weighted
responses to artworks 'in which any set of traces or marks can be
allegorized into our favorite narrative of the moment' (p. 169). In its
place, we need 'more varied currents of implication' than the analogical
or the allegorical tend to provide since what the path towards 'partial'
intelligibility gives us is 'more like a feeling, after a period of time, of
what we call knowing our way around the work, as we know our way
around a city' (pp. 169, 175). It is for this reason that Fisher rejects
any attempt at directly correlating Twombly with Pamass/ls (1510),
one of Raphael's four wall frescoes in the Stanza della Segnatura of the
Vatican. It is not as iI' one were a 'coded translation' of the other
because, Fisher believes, treating the Raphael as a 'source' ends in
'distracting explanation' (pp. 176 & 178). Rather, Fisher finds the
two, for all their independence of materials and techniques, probing
much the same theme, namely, 'the technical, physical mystery of his
own art, painting, by means of a tribute to the rival art of poetry with
its great masters Homer, Sappho, and Dante' (p. 178).
Why, to return to the theme of the contrast between the verbal and
the visual arts, should Fisher take such pains with the matter of
memory? From the onset, he argues that 'memory and narrative are
antagonistic to an aesthetics of wonder' (p. 6). In terms of his
Cartesian aesthetic, Fisher distinguishes memory and its attendant
expectations from wonder in terms of the former being subject to the
will and the latter being dependent upon 'the complete absence of
expectation' (p. 21). Furthermore, memory is intrinsic to the 'arts of
time--narration, dance, and music', none of which are 'present as a
whole in an instant of time', so that wonder is at best 'replaced ... by
mere surprise, as in a twist of plot' and, at worst, 'ruled out' (p. 21).
To those who would accuse Fisher of ignoring the narrative dimension
of the visual arts, his concession is to claim that 'control over it has
passed from the artist to the viewer' (p. 23). To those who would
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accuse Fisher of ignoring the non-narrative verbal arts as found in the
lyric genre, his counterclaim is to point at the 'syntactic am
grammatical expectations' basic to lyric and narrative alike (p. 22).
Cast in slightly different terms, Fisher regards the visual as having
a 'paratactic structure' - a listing of elements ('and ... and ... and .
. ".) - whereas the verbal is possessed of a 'hypotactic structure': a
logical or causal connection amongst elements ('if . . . then . . .',
'because ...', 'unless ... ', and so forth) which he identifies with
narrative if not memory (p. 98). Only when writing approximates the
visual in the form of an algebraic equation, a diagram, or a list of
notes does it 'transfer the successive into the simultaneous' and do we
'push ourselves toward a more and more simultaneous presence of
what had to be in the memory a successive series of facts' (pp. 131-
132). Whilst memory, rooted in time, only allows two elements to be
'directly adjacent to each other', the visual enables a multiplicity of
elements to bear this relationship (p. 132). The consequences of such
an argument verge upon the bizarre. For example, how are we to
construe Cy Twombly's Discourses on Commodus (1963)? In so far as
this abstract work comprises nine large canvas panels - 204 x 134
cm each - which cannot be viewed simultaneously, are we to treat it
narratively or sequentially and thus never wondrously? Conversely,
how are we to construe Twombly's drawing, Orpheus (1975), with its
four pencilled lines scrawled across the boltom:
Be ever dead in Eurydice. mount more singingly
Mount more praisingly back into the pure relation
fire. among the warning. he in the realm of [decline?).
be a ringing glass that shivers even as it rings?
Can we only experience wonder with the non-verbal portion of the
drawing, and only a modicum of mere surprise with the verbal? For
those of us with more literary inclinations, the writings of a William
Blake in Songs of Experience (1794) or a Guillaume Apollinaire in
Calligrammes (1918) would raise much the same puzzlement. Nor can
we so uncritically presume, as does Fisher, that reading is purely
reducible to the sequential, let alone organised paratactically. Whether
taken from the individual perspective of reader-response developed by a
Wolfgang Iser in, say, The Implied Reader (1974) or from the
communal perspective of contrastive rhetoric developed by a Robert
Kaplan in, say, The Anatomy of Rhetoric (1972), the dynamics of
reading literal and non-literal texts has been long understood to be as
finely nuanced as Fisher suggests is the case with coming to know our
way around a painting.
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In so far as Fisher can be said to have resurrected a Cartesian
aesthetic by which to capture the experience of natural and human
artefacts and their transformation into objects of intelligibility,
Wonder, the Rainbow, and the Aesthetics of Pure Experiences
constitutes a significant contribution to aesthetic enquiry. Yet nagging
doubts remain over and above those already outlined. Perhaps they can
be summarised in terms of the lack of engagement with aesthetic
debate. To characterise wonderment as the gradual 'unfolding of
attention and questioning' in the presence of an object, as 'the play of
the mind over the details of the object itself' (pp. 6, 39), fails to
differentiate it from Kant's conception of the beautiful. Indeed, Fisher's
encounter with the paintings of Twombly comprising the last sixth of
his book could arguably be interpreted as a practical exposition of the
very tradition he scorns. So the suspicion remains: is this encounter
not one which ultimately rehearses the fourfold characterisation of the
aesthetic experience of beauty with which Kant concludes the first part
of his Kritik der Urteilskraft (1793)?
R. A. GOODRICH
Richard Harland, Literary Theory from Plato to Barthes: An
Introductory History, London: Macmillan, 1999.
'It must be a very big book', responded my mother when I told her
I had a history of two and a half thousand years of Western literary
theory to review. It's not, as it happens. Indeed, 24D-odd pages of text
(there are three pages of time charts and a glossary) seems barely
enough space in which to name the names - all of them, incidentally.
predictable in a way that, thanks to the cultural recuperations of the
last twenty years, a history of literature itself could no longer afford to
be. Conspectuses of any kind prove annoying to the specialist because
they are bound to appear inadequate on the subject of his or her
specialty, and that inadequacy has a way of looking like
misrepresentation. A conspectus as summary as Harland's can be
especially annoying. No theorist discussed (with one or two exceptions
amongst the twentieth-century thinkers) can be allowed to change his
or her mind; none has the space to allow for developments through
trial or debate. And this is only exacerbated by the fact that, no matter
how encyclopredic the aspiration. some individuals and periods and
schools will be granted no recognition at all and some will be granted
more than others. Classical literary theory (the Sophists. Plato.
Aristotle, Demetrius, Cicero, Quintillian. Horace, Plotinus, Proclus.
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Longinus) and Romantic literary theory (Goethe, Schiller, Herder,
Kant, the Schlegels, Wordsworth, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Coleridge,
Hegel, Schleiermacher, Keats, Shelley, Saint-Beuve, Emerson, Poe)
are allowed twenty pages each, but so is structuralism and narratology
(Jakobson, Levi-Strauss, Propp, Greimas, Bremond, Todorov,
Barthes). Putting aside the author's particular interests - 'No doubt
my understanding is also affected by my career as a writer of
SF/fantasy fiction', Harland warns in his Preface (p. xii) - in all,
only ninety pages are dedicated to 'telling the story' (p. xi) of literary
theory until the mid nineteenth century, with 150 pages given over to
the last ISO-odd years.
The ordering throughout is roughly chronological - with the
single, unexplained exception of a discussion of Mme de Stael in the
context of early twentieth-century feminist theory, itself a footnote to
a chapter on twentieth-century phenomenology - and Harland's
chapters are as unsurprising as his choice of individual critics: 'Literary
Theory in Classical Times'; 'Literary Theory in the Middle Ages';
'The Rise and Fall of Neoclassicism'; 'Romantic Literary Theory';
'Social Theories of the Nineteenth Century'; 'Naturalism, Symbolism
and Modernism'; 'New Developments in Theory [Nietzsche; Freud;
Saussure; Marxism]'; '20th-Century Russian Theory'; 'Anglo-
American Theory, 1900-60'; 'Phenomenological Criticism in France
and Germany'; 'French Structuralism' - with an 'Epilogue: Into the
Postmodernist Period'. Some theories are characterized according to
period, you will note, some according to period and place, others
according to a prevailing style or an artistic movement; some are
discussed as 'apologies' for the poetry that prevailed in a particular
period, others as manifestos designed to disrupt and reorient prevailing
taste, creating the taste by which innovative poetry is to be understood
and enjoyed. If this labelling appears arbitrary and the different genres
in which the various theories are expounded appear only occasionally
and perfunctorily acknowledged, that is a legacy of the older academic
tradition within which Harland is working, and working (it has to be
said) uncritically - for it is never Harland's business to challenge that
tradition or to revise and reconfigure it any way.
Nor is it Harland's business critically to challenge the individual
theories themselves. Nowhere are the literary and non-literary
assumptions upon which the selected theories are based subject to
more than cursory analysis. There simply isn't the space. Very
occasionally, a theory will be characterized as failing to deliver the
explanation or interpretative facility to which it aspires. 'Such
practical disappointments are not uncommon with the narratologists
generally' (p. 231) is Harland's polite way of saying that the
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theoretically rigorous anatomizations of narrative offered by Greimas
and others prove inadequate for the critical analysis of individual texts
and offer little if any insight into the nature and function of literature.
A history it may be, moreover, but the whole issue of the
historical or historicist dimension of theory, as of literature itself -
while raised with regard to the thinking of Vico and Taine and Marx,
of Gadamer and Jauss and (belatedly and unconncctedly) of de Stael -
is never addressed independently or adopted in his accounts of the
different theories. Or if it is adopted, as in the case of Modernism and
some of the post-Romantic French theories that wear their ideology on
their sleeves, it is never applied either rigorously or critically. In short,
not only are we given no indication of the immediate culture wars out
of which grew the many, many theories that began as acts of
aggression and/or defence, but there is no atlempt at the sort of
historical and ideological accounting that we find in, say, Terry
Eagleton's critical surveys of many of the same writers - in his
Literary Theory (1983; 1996), in Ideology of tire Aesthetic (1990),
The Function ofCriticism (1984), and elsewhere. 'I have tried to avoid
making personal judgements on the trends presented', writes Harland
(p. xii). Again, even if he wanted to, there isn't the space. However
conflicted the history of literary theory, neither conflict nor
competition features in his account.
As it happens, Harland's own heritage is made apparent in his
dedication to Jonathan Culler. The tradition in which he works is an
entrepreneurial rather than a critical one; it is the tradition of making
voluminous and/or abstruse material readily available to the
undergraduate and non-specialist. It is a tradition of cultural midwifery
that (with scholarly journals like this one) dates back to the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and can include texts like Freud
in 90 Minutes or Derrida for Beginners along with many insightful,
comprehensive, and sometimes creatively organized surveys. Judged in
this tradition, Harland's 'introductory history' of Western literary
theory is a useful text. He has, in short, Culler's art of making
accessible and relevant what might strike the uninformed reader as
impossibly difficult or remote and, though seriously inhibited by his
determination to trawl through all of those he takes to be the major
theorists, is a skilled expositor. And a lively one: only during his
comparatively detailed paraphrase of Structuralism's intricate systemat-
izing did I find his account start to drag.
One other thing worth remarking is the extent to which, just in the
two years since the book was published, the sense of importance, not
to say urgency, attaching to literary theory has disappeared - and with
it the conviction that addressing literary theory directly and
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comprehensively is the only honest way of dealing with something we
are going to be doing anyway. As a survey of literary theory - of the
attempt systematically to account for the nature and function of
literature - it necessarily excludes some of the most interesting
things that have been said about literature, but it also excludes some of
the most interesting things that have been said against literary theory
itself. Harland's account doesn't attempt to bring the story up to date
for the simple reason that he has dealt with later theories at more
length elsewhere - in Superstructuralism (1987) and Beyond
Superstructuralism (1993). It is telling. however, that it is not only
in this latest survey of literary theory that he has dealt only cautiously
with historicist theories. He doesn't deal with them at any length in
his earlier studies either. And yet few things are more susceptible to
historicization than the whole phenomenon of 'Literary Theory' itself.
the embattled rage for the evolution and teaching of literary theory
within the academy in the closing years of the twentieth century.
(Though perhaps I should add that. within the broad category of
Literary Theory, no one theory is more susceptible to historicization
than the New Historicism!)
WILLIAM CHRISTIE
Richard Wollheim, On The Emotions, New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1999.
This book will be mined and criticized for years to come. I know of
nothing of such scope and depth on the topic written by any
philosopher. While Wollheim's view assumes a lot of psychoanalytic
theory along the way, it is only some diminution of the interest of his
view if you imagine it without that support. On the other hand,
Wollheim distrusts the Russellian doctrine defining mental states as
'propositional attitudes' because it renders (he unconscious
implausible. His delinguisticizing of psychology in favour of its
repsychologizing may be welcome for all sorts of reasons, not least of
which being that the unconscious may have less articulate denizens,
whose expression, if we imagine it as verbal, may be more like the
language we find in some of Samuel Beckett. Indeed. the primary
inhabitants of the unconscious may just be emotions. That is a view
that some contemporary psychoanalysts have arrived at in their own
ways.
Wollheim seeks a comprehensive theory of what emotions are. His
enterprise is not a matter of conceptual analysis of the kind infused
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with commitment to considerations of what we do and do not say or
even of what it makes sense to say using the going vocabulary of our
emotions. Nor does Wollheim defer to cognitive science or
evolutionary psychology as an enterprise we must wait upon to
resolve our concerns. Emotion is such a major component of our
mental lives that reflection and philosophical argument is a good
enough methodology. Not only that but philosophy ('applied',
Wollheim calls it in this connection) is what has to be done if theses
and discoveries arising out of more (supposedly scientific) approaches
are to be assessed.
Wollheim does, as I indicated above, adhere to psychoanalysis,
especially to the post-Freudian developments of that theory in the
work of Melanie Klein. Elsewhere, Wollheim has commended Klein as
the proper continuator of psychoanalysis. Wollheim is himself well
known for his writing on psychoanalysis. In that writing, in sharp
contrast to Wittgenstein's reading of Freud as a deviser of radically new
concepts for talking about the mind, Wollheim reads Freud ani
psychoanalysis as (may one say 'only' ?) an extension and deepening
of common sense psychology.
Wollheim's philosophical psychology, following David Hume's,
takes belief and desire as dual pillars of the edifice of the human mind.
Emotion comes ('rides piggyback', as Wollheim puts it) into our lives
via the satisfaction and frustration of desire. The reason for this
privileging of belief and desire is simple enough. Our actions have to
be explained by an appropriate mix of desire with instrumental belief
as to how doing this or that will bring about the change in the world
which desire aims for. Belief and desire join to produce intentional
action.
Wollheim gives us an image to cling to as we work through the
latest exposition of the theory of mind that he has offered us before,
especially in The Thread of Life (Cambridge, Mass.; 1984). Our
beliefs provide us with our map, desires with our targets and emotions
with our orientation. Orientation is a matter of regions of the map (arxl
the territory) being tinted or highlighted more or less than other
regions. It helps the analogy for the reader to reflect on the experiences
of looking at one of those maps with a 'you are here' on it and then
studying the surroundings and where you seek to go. It helps further to
keep in mind that we carry with us a plethora of aims, desires arxl
purposes, some more or less in the forefront of consciousness, but
some (who knows for sure which ones) hidden in the recesses of our
unconscious (assuming there is such a place and that it is pretty much
what psychoanalysis says it is).
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Our minds are made up of mental states - the ingredients of our
streams of consciousness - and of mental dispositions, which
underlie the states and, one might say, cause the waves, eddies and
swirls of the stream. Beliefs, desires and emotions should be
understood primarily as dispositions. Feelings (which are states) such
as pangs of grief or remorse, surges of anger or delight, are among the
manifestations of emotion, not emotion itself. There are non-
contingent relations between the disposition and some of its
manifestations. Wollheim has a convincing set of views about the
expression of emotion and the ties between emotions and certain of
their manifestations. These ties are logical or internal, and not merely
contingently causal. He follows and develops Wittgenstein's view
(Philosophical Investigations, 536) on this matter, a view whereby
the difficulty is sharply brought out of such a feat as supposing
cogently that smiling should come to be related to anger as scowling
is, and scowling come to be related to joy as smiling is.
While expressions are logically, not merely causally related to
emotions, desires and actions are not constitutive of emotions in this
way, as many theories have maintained. Wollheim accepts that the
established usage of the idioms of fear connect fear with flight and
avoidance. And he accepts that many emotions are thus semantically
related to behavioural language. He holds that this is due to the
frequency with which fear causes a desire to be elsewhere or to take
protective steps, which has led to our language containing a word 'fear'
that has such meanings. The relation is not like that between joy and
smiling or anger and scowling; flight is not an expression of fear, it is
action caused by fear, which often causes a desire to be safe from harm
which, combined with a belief about what will lead to that, causes an
act of flight or protection. But such a desire and belief may not occur.
We can be paralysed with fear, our practical reasoning stymied
completely.
It is worth a bit more here about just how striking a view this is.
Wollheim is claiming, in effect, that many words in the language have
meanings with a built-in contingent causal relation. Consider how a
word like 'puncture' means not just the making of a hole in a tire or
balloon, but a making of a hole that is the cause of deflation. It is a
contingent regularity that the two distinct events of hole-producing and
deflation are regularly conjoined. But our interest in tires and balloons
remaining inflated in order that they behave as we want them to has led
in the language to the convenience of a single word for this common
conjunction of events. Hume observed this a long time ago and he
observed as well that it misleads philosophers into thinking they have
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discerned necessary connections in nature instead of thinking, as they
should, that the necessity is merely linguistic.
According to Wollheim, while emotion can cause desire which,
joined with instrumental belief, causes action, emotion itself, the
dispositional condition that an emotion really is, need not cause desire,
nor need any emotion cause a desire in the range of desires that we may
associate with an emotion. If we do not confuse expression with
manifestation in general, this thought will not be so hard to swallow.
It is easier to accept this view if one accepts that it is a mistake to
think that even something as provocative to action as pain is still only
contingently related to the desire to have the pain cease or to get out of
harm's way.
While such behaviour is widespread, it can be inhibited. If we
appreciate that having a pain is having a reason to act to stop it or
avoid more of it, we can see that there may well be other reasons, in a
given case, to abide the pain, even occasions for rejoicing that one
feels pain. Severe pain on coming out of an anaesthetic may be a sign
that the operation was a success; you will live; no pain and you would
have been doomed. Many people insist that the effect of nitrous oxide
does not lessen pain but only renders them unconcerned about it. It is a
common tale (perhaps a myth) in philosophy of mind classes that
people with lobotomies say that a pain is still there, hurts just as
much, but that it doesn't matter. The story is so widespread that a
student is as likely to bring it up as a teacher is.
We are also offered another variety of expression of emotion, one
that Wollheim has often explored and exploited in his writing about
art. Emotion is expressed in how some bit of the world strikes one, as
shown elegantly by Hamlet's 'How weary, stale, flat and unprofitable
seem to me all the uses of this world'. This characterising of the world
in some way or other is a matter of projecting an emotion onto or into
the world. When it is the natural world, and a scene we witness
together strikes me as foreboding and you as merely sombre, there is
no question of getting it right. Nature - no doubt within some limits
stemming from our psychology and culture - lets itself be responded
to in myriad ways, ways that involve feelings not likely to be housed
in one mind at the same time. But when it is art to which we respond,
a competent artist is trying to elicit or compel a response from us that
sees his work as he intends. He may fail, and a critic's job is, in large
part, to discern what he was up to and explain how the work exhibits a
failed, instead of a fulfilled intention.
It is not a long journey from this way of thinking about emotion
to the idea that value and emotion are intimately related. Wollheim has
quite a lot to say about this. He does so, as I read him, without
188
Reviews
commitment to either the view that emotion is perception of value (a
view foolhardily endorsed by some philosophers) or the view that
value is a projection of emotion - and this view's companion: that
ethical and aesthetic judgement are expressions of emotion, not
statements of fact.
I need to give now what ought to have begun this review. a
description of what, according to Wollheim. an emotion is and how
emotions come to be and how they endure or pass away. The
experience of frustration of desire and of the satisfaction of desire is the
route by which emotion enters our lives. It is vital that Wollheim
speaks of experiences here. The satisfaction or frustration of. e.g.• my
desire that Labor win the next election may be understood as
consisting in the result of the forthcoming election. My desire may,
on such an understanding, be satisfied or frustrated even if I die before
the election.
With a notion of satisfaction and frustration of this merely logico-
semantic variety, there is no way that desire can be seen as the engine
which generates our emotions. It is Wollheim's theory that it is the
experience of frustrated or satisfied desire which brings emotion in its
train. Well, not quite. For he holds that it is not only such experience
that can do it. but also the experience of anticipated satisfaction or
frustration; and this can work regardless of the beliefs involved being
true or false. I can be as downcast by a false belief that my team has
lost or by confident expert forecast that they will lose as I can be
through the experience of witnessing or learning of the actual loss.
Wollheim does not ad.! to this list the imagining of the loss, though
as far as I can see, this may also cast me down a bit, just as
fantasizing their glorious victory may buoy me up.
There will be differences in these cases with regard to what sort of a
history the emotion will have, differences as to its durability am
termination. As Wollheim sees it, there is nothing that must tenninate
an emotion in the way that taking in evidence can terminate a belief by
replacing it with its contradiction, or an apprehended fact can tenninate
a desire by fulfilling it. A corrected belief may stop the formation of
an emotion, but it may just alter the fact or object that the emotion
takes as precipitating it. You are angry at the barking dog next door,
for it is interfering with your reading and your sleeping; you learn it is
a video recording of your neighbour's dead dog and your anger latches
on to him for his bizarre and annoying taste. You learn that he is old.
terribly lonely. and the dog long dead; so he plays a recording of it
now and then. Your anger does not dissipate, but shifts toward a
society where lives can become so empty as to let pets mean so much.
It is worth noting here how an apology, no malt'~r how sincere. can
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exacerbate the resentment of its recipient or at least fail to bring the
turbulence of resentment and (perhaps) self-pity to rest. The
resentment now seems to be focused on the apology (or its giver) for
having deprived one of a legitimate grievance.
Emotions have origins and histories and narrative is vital to the
existence and nature of an emotion. Emotion is mnemic; a fright I get
today from seeing a snake may be a manifestation of a fear of mine
that has persisted since childhood (or is perhaps even innate).
Wollheim gives an example of fear of frogs inaugurated when a youth
awakes on a summer's day to the croak and sight of a large frog on his
chest. The youth's subsequent encounters (or prospective ones) with
frogs may be troubled all his life and other scares and frights may
evoke dreadful memories of that frog back then; and the memories
reinforce the tenacity of the fear. It is this property of emotion, as I
understand Wollheim, that we must acknowledge if we are to accept
the views of psychoanalysis about phantasy (as Melanie Klein used
that notion) and our unconscious minds. What happens in childhood,
especially early childhood, lays down emotions whose course may run
all one's life long.
This point is vital to what may be the most radical and
controversial part of this book. Wollheim's last chapter is about the
'so-called' (Wollheim's words) moral emotions. He discusses guilt and
shame in detail. With the other emotions, as said above, the key is the
frustration or satisfaction of desire. Frustration is replaced in the cases
of guilt and shame with what Wollheim speaks of as a lowering of
one's sense of self. Presumably, things like self-esteem and pride are
risings of this sense of oneself. This is reminiscent of Spinoza, with
his talk of increase and decrease of power.
Wollheim thinks that guilt (the reproaching voices of others) and
shame (the reproaching eyes of others) are emotions inaugurated in
childhood (my word, not Wollheim's) and central to our acquisition of,
or inculcation into morality. But contrary to the majority of
philosophers (even Nietzsche is not pellucid about this), Wollheim
does not see it as a good thing, but rather as baneful (a word he likes)
that we remain so vulnerable to reproach, real or imagined, reasonable
or unreasonable, as an outcome of the vicissitudes of the superego,
which may be modified by love, given and received, into the less
oppressive ego ideal. Wollheim sees morality, especially morality
achieved with obligation as its core, as an unhappy outcome of the
internalisation of terrifying and powerful figures from early life. Love
may bring us through this without too much crippling guilt and
shame as the price we cannot but pay, on most views of the matter,
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for developing some degree of moral conscientiousness. Guilt aOO
shame are products, as Freud (and Nietzsche) said, of our
aggressiveness, with good people being those who have twned a good
deal of this aggressiveness onto themselves in the form of self-
punishing guilt and shame. I rather think Wollheim is more convinced
of the banefulness of all this than were either Nietzsche or Freud, who
sometimes seem to be suggesting that the wonders as well as the woes
of civilisation and culture stem from the same source.
Wollheim demurs on the supposed value of rational guilt as
opposed to irrational guilt (or shame). Guilt and shame like any
emotions, are doubtfully to be assessed as rational or irrational.
Wollheim inclines to the view that while our actions, our beliefs aOO
our desires are rational or irrational, our emotions are neither. We are
misled by the fact that many emotions involve irrational beliefs, are
precipitated by false and irrational beliefs. In some such cases -
though not always - reason's effect will be to wither the emotion
more or less on the vine. This most obviously happens when the
emotion involves a false but rational belief which is corrected.
Irrationality in forming beliefs may, after all, itself be caused by
emotions and those causes may keep an emotion going right through
the availability of correction, even hinder such correction. Othello's
jealousy helps his unreason which intensifies his jealousy, which ...
Othello is not left out of Wollheim's discussion, enriching it along
with other glowing spots of literary erudition, all of which illuminate
and surprise. If Wollheim had time, a philosophy of literature to match
his philosophy of painting would no doubt deploy the understanding
and insight displayed in this book. In the absence of that, this book's
attraction and force as philosophical psychology, and especially as
moral psychology, make it valuable for reflection about literature in
any event.
LLOYD REINHARDT
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